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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
J. ROYAL ANDREASEN and ALTA 
N. ANDREASEN, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents 
vs 
GEORGE H. HANSEN and FLOR-
ENCE HANSEN, 
Defendants and Appellants 
Case 
No. 8769 
PETITION FOR A REHEARING AND BRIEF IN 
SUPPORT THEREOF 
Come now the plaintiffs and respondents in the 
above entitled action and respectfully petition the court 
to grant a rehearing for the reasons and upon the ground 
that in its opinion heretofore written the court erred in 
the following particulars: 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS STATEMENT OF THE F AC'TS 
- ----.~-------------
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AND ITS APPRAISAL OF THE EVIDENCE GENERALLY 
AND IN MANY MATERIAL PARTICULARS. 
POINT II 
·THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFFS 
AND RESPONDENTS HAD ELECTED TO RETAIN THE 
EARNEST MONEY PAID AS LIQUIDATED AND AGREED 
DAMAGES. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN REVERSING THE JUDGMENT 
SINCE IN SO DOING IT REVERSED THE TRIAL COURT'S 
JUDGMENT QUIETING TITLE IN PLAINTIFFS AND RE-
SPONDENTS AS AGAINST DEFENDANTS AND APPELL-
ANTS. 
POINT IV 
IF LOSS OF AN ADVANTAGEOUS BARGAIN IS NO 
LONGER A PROPER MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR 
BREACH OF A CONTRACT TO PURCHASE REAL ESTATE, 
THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL 
TO CORRECTLY ASSESS DAMAGES UNDER A CORRECT 
MEASURE AS SET OUT BY THIS COURT. 
I, the undersigned attorney for the plaintiffs and 
respondents herein, certify that in 1ny opinion there is 
merit to the foregoing claiin and that the court cmnmitted 
errors in the particulars above specified. 
JOHN H. ALLEN 
.Attorney for Plaintiffs and 
Respondents 
1020 Kearns Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
AND ITS APPRAISAL OF THE EVIDENCE GENERALLY 
AND IN MANY MATERIAL PARTICULARS. 
In reviewing the findings and judgment of the trial 
court the Supreme Court is obligated to view the evi-
dence and every inference and intendment fairly arising 
therefrom in a light most favorable to the party pre-
valing in the court below, Buehner Block Co. v. Glezos, 
6 Utah 2d 226, 310 P2d 517, Parrish v. Taht.aras, 7 Utah 
2d 87, 318 P2d 642, Hoyt v. Wasatch Homes, 1 Utah 2d 9, 
261 P2d 927, and it i~ presurned that the facts support 
the findings of the trial court, and that the findings sup-
port the judgment. Larsen v. J}ladsen, 87 Utah 48, 48 P2d 
429. See also Bartholomew v. Pickett 51 Utah 312, 170 
P 65. The reasons for giving such weight to the findings 
and judgment of the trial court are effectively set out 
by this court in Nokes v. Continental Mining and Nlillin!J 
Company 6 Utah 2d 177, 308 P2d 954, 955: 
The rule just stated is based upon the sound 
reasoning that some credit should be indulged in 
favor of the findings of the trial court because 
of the advantages peculiar to his position in im-
mediate contact with the trial. It is indeed often 
true that "the 1natter has more eloquence than 
naked words portend." There are intangibles of 
expression and attitude which give color and 
meaning not apparent from words alone. The 
judge feels the impact of the personalities of the 
parties and the witnesses: He is able to observe 
their appearances and behavior; their forthright-
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4 
ness or hesitancy in answering; their frankness 
and candor, or lack of it. Similarly revealing to 
him are indications of surprise, anger, resent-
ment or vindictiveness, pleasure or other emotions 
which may be discerned from expressions of their 
countenance or voice. He also has some advan-
tage in appraising their abilities to understand 
and their capacities to remember. Furthermore, 
he is in a position to question the witness himself 
to clarify doubtful points or verify his impress-
ions on the matters just mentioned. All of this 
combines to afford him better insight as to the 
truthfulness of the testimony offered than does 
a perusal of the cold record. It is a sound and 
well-recognized policy of the law to repose some 
confidence in the verity of the actions of the trial 
court, and not to interfere with them unless ·it 
clearly appears that he is in error. (Emphasis 
Added) 
The trial court in the instant case made the following 
findings of fact : 
1. On or about January 30, 1956 the defen-
dants George H. Hansen and Florence Hansen 
entered into a written contract whereby the de-
fendant~. George H. Hansen and Florence Hansen, 
unconditionally agreed to purchase of the plain-
tiff:-; a certain piece of real property known as 
1233-1~;~;) Almneda AYenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
and thr drfendauts entrrcd into said contract ·zcith 
full knou·f~'d.flc of the terms of said contract. 
:2. 1Vithout a n.11 jnstifi'ca.tion or e.rcuse the 
defendants breached ,-.·aid contract and dz~d refuse 
and fail to perform the terms of said contract. 
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5 
3. At all tvmes the pla:intiffs were ready, 
willing, and able to perform said contract. Plain-
tiffs did not breach savd contract in any particu-
lar. 
4. In making said contract the defendants 
deposited the sum of $50.00 as earnest money with 
Holt Realty Company. Plaintiff did not at .any 
time agree or elect to accept or retain said earnest 
money in lieu of damages. Plaintiffs' actual dam-
ages caused by the breach of the defendants are 
grossly disproportionate to the amount of said 
earnest nwney deposit, and said earnest money 
deposit is grossly inadequate to compensate plain-
tiffs for losses proximately resulting from breach 
of contract by the defendants. 
5. After breach of said con tract by the de-
fendants, the plaintiffs nuade diligent and reason-
able efforts to resell said property and did find 
.another buyer for said property, but only upon 
terms less advantageous to the plantiffs than the 
terms of the contract with the defendants, and by 
reason of the defendants' breach of contract the 
plazntiffs realized from the sale of s,aid property 
$2,100.00 less than plaintiffs would have realized 
under the terms of the contract with the defend-
ants. Plaintiffs' dmnages in the sum of $2,100.00 
consist of the following items: 
(a) difference in the total sale price, 
$1,000.00, 
(b) value of refrigerator included with 
second sale, $150.00, 
(c) expense of real estate commission in 
obtaining the second sale, $700.00, and 
(d) the plaintiffs' time in obtaining the 
new sale, $250.00. 
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6 
The second contract provides for interest at 
the rate of 5Jf2 per cent per annum of the unpaid 
balance in contrast to the provision for 6 per cent 
interest per annum on the unpaid balance in the 
contract with the defendants, but the court de-
clines to award the plaintiffs any damage for loss 
of interest. 
6. The defendants agreed in said contract 
with the plaintiffs to pay all expenses of en-
forcing said contract or the rights arising out of 
breach thereof, including a reasonable attorney's 
fee. Plaintiffs hired counsel to represent them 
in the prosecution of this action and a reasonable 
su1n to be awarded to the plaintiffs for attorney's 
fees is the sum of $250.00. (Emphasis added) 
Since the Supreme Court's n1ain opinion adopted the 
evidence as alleged by the defendants, and went beyond 
this evidence by discussing 1natters of which the defend-
ants did not complain and of which they made no point 
either in the court below or before this Court on appeal, 
the plaintiffs feel that in their prior appearance before 
the Supren1e Court they did not adequately bring to the 
attention of the Court the fac.t that the trial court's 
findings in favor of the plaintiffs were runply and thor-
oughly supported by the evidence, and feel it is therefore 
IH'<'<'~~ar~· to review briefly son1e of the evidence support-
ing tlw findings in favor of the plaintiffs. Tlris evidence 
~hould be viewed in a light most favorable to the plain-
tiffs as the prevailing party below. 
Plaintiffs' duplex "·as listed for sale with Holt Real-
ty Company. Tr. 20-29, 21-1, 57-14, 57-25, 57-28, 58-1. 
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Defendants saw an advertisement concerning the prop-
erty and called a salesman, ~1:rs. Abbey, and arranged 
for a showing early in the afternoon of January 29, 1956. 
Tr. 21-4, 53-18, 56-26, 71-24. Defendants liked the prop-
erty, were interested in buying it and spent an hour 
thoroughly inspecting it. r:er. 21-19, 22-3, 72-4, 72-26 
through 76-30, 40-17, 54-3, 112-17, 112-24, 113-2. They 
observed the age and condition of the house and had 
explained to then1 the personal property which went with 
the house. Tr. 73-20, 74-4, 76-18, 151-28, 152-23. They de-
clined an offer of the salesman to show them further 
around the neighborhood, saying that they were ac-
quainted with the area. Tr. 54-7, 22-3, 128-2. Defendants 
were not "persuaded" to submit an offer of $15,000.00 
and to make a deposit of $50.00 as indicated in this 
Court's opinion. On the contrary, as Mrs. Abbey drove 
them home, the Hansens expressed their desire to make 
an offer to purchase the property. They were advised by 
Mrs. Abbey as follows: 
And Mr. Hansen said he would like to make 
an offer on the house, and I suggested that they 
think about it by taking them home and that I 
would call them later in the afternoon that I 
thought it was too quick to make up their minds. 
Tr. 22-12. 
Later that day the Hansens asked Mrs. Abbey to c01ne 
to their home since they wanted to make an offer on the 
property and could pay from $15,000.00 to $15,900.00. 
Tr. 22-24, 45-1, 129-27. The Hansens suggested that the 
offer be $15,500.00 and Mrs. Abbey rec01nmended that 
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they make the offer only $15,000.00. Tr. 22-27, 24-3, 2-!-15. 
The earnest money agree1nent was therefore filled 
out under the instructions and directions of the Hansens 
and in their presence. The defendants thoroughly con-
sidered the terms of the offer item by item, read the 
document, and signed it. In accepting the defendants' 
claim that they did not understand the terms of the 
contract, the Supreme Court has overlooked ample evi-
dence to the contrary which the trial court heard and 
believed. The Supreme Court's opinion considered the 
defendants' testimony credible (unlike the trial court 
which heard the testilnony) and recited that there was no 
indication that the defendants understood the terms of 
the contract and that every inference was to the contrary. 
This statement is clearly contrary to the finding of 
fact of the trial court which is as follows: 
... The defendants entered into the contract 
with full knowledge of the terms of said contract. 
(Paragraph I Findings of Fact.) 
This finding of the trial court is fully supported by 
the evidence and is entitled to a presun1ption of correct-
ness since the trial court had the opportunity of observ-
ing the demeanor of the defendants as witnesses and 
making its decision as to the truthfulness of their testi-
Inony. 
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When preparing the offer, the terms of the contract 
were discussed in detail between Mrs. Abbey and Mr. 
and Mrs. Hansen and their daughter. Tr. 23-3, 25-3, 26-
22, 26-11, 161-5. Mrs. Abbey testified as follows: 
I got the real estate contract out, and we went 
over it, item by item, hot (sic) it was to be filled 
in, each item you have to ask the customer every-
thing, from how they wanted it, in joint tenancy, 
the time they wanted to take to pay, how much did 
they want to put down, how they wanted to pay 
the rest of the balance of the money, their interest 
rate, everything has to be discussed, item for item. 
Tr. 24-17. 
To further emphasize the unreasonableness of the 
defendants' allegation that they misunderstood the mean-
ing of the contract and that they thought it was simply 
an offer and receipt for $50.00 and if they did not want 
the property the $50.00 would be forfeited, and to em-
phasize the reasonableness of the trial court's findings 
that defendants fully understood the contract, the record 
shows that a short time prior to the signing of this 
e~rnest money receipt and offer to purchase the Hansen8 
had sold their own home in a similar transaction using 
an earnest money receipt and offer to purchase, the 
terms of which were also explained to them at that time. 
Mr. Hansen testified in part: 
Q. Were they to handle the transaction and 
draw the papers on it~ 
A. They did. 
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Q. Did they present those papers to you? 
A. They did. 
Q. Did you sign then1? 
A. I did. 
Q. Did you read them before you signed 
them with your realtor~ 
A. 1\ o, they were explained to me. 
Q. You did not read then1 at all? 
A. Ko. It \Yas explained to me that you-
Q. Just a minute. Just answer the question. 
Did you sign an earnest rnoney receipt in connec-
tion 1cith your transaction? 
A. Y cs. (Tr. 170-26 to 171-9) (Emphasis 
added.) 
Defendants were not "'high pressured" into this purchase, 
as indicated by the Court's opinion, but admitted that 
they entered into the contract willingly and that nothing 
was 1nisrepresented to then1. ~Irs. Abbey testified as fol-
lows: 
:Jf r. \Yebber asked then1 if there was anything 
wrong with the house, and they said, •·x o," and 
he al~o asked or said, "'Has ~Irs. Abbey twisted 
your ann, or in any Inanner Inisrepresented the 
lion~(\'' and thPy ~aid, "'X o." 
_.\nd ~hf' ~aid thf·~~ just didn't want the house, 
thP~- guessed tl)(_~~- had bought it too quickly, -
1\f r~. Hansen said that. 
She ~aid. "l guess we just bought it too quick-
!)·." Tr. 35-16. 
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'"'[r. Andrea8en testified as follows, quoting his conver-
sation with :Mrs. Hansen wLen she a.-;ked to cancel the 
contract: 
I said, "Is there anything the matter with the 
house; did the agent misrepresent anything to 
you~" 
No, it was not that, we just can't take it." 
"Well, why can't you~" 
She said, "VVell, we are having smne family 
trouble about it. We just decided we can't take it 
and we would like to ·withdraw. Vlill you let us 
mtt of it?" Tr. 80-18. (E1nphasis added) 
Plaintiffs accepted the offer as Inade by the defendants, 
and relying upon defendants' unconditional agreement 
to purchase, informed other prospective purchasers that 
the property had been sold, and inforn1ed other salesman 
of this fact and advised them not to bring any Inore 
people around to see the property. The listing agent, 
Holt Realty, reported the property sold, and the listing 
was withdrawn from the Multiple Listing Bureau. 
After the offer was accepted the Hansens called the 
plaintiffs and acknowledged that they had purchased the 
property. Mrs. Alta Andreasen testified as follows: 
A. Yes, After Mrs. Abbey and Mr. Webber 
had left, some time, I don't remember how long 
after, but later in the evening, the telephone rang 
and I answered it. Mrs. Hansen identified herself 
and she said, "I understand we have bottght your 
house?" Emphasis added) 
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I said, "Yes." 
She said, "I would like to bring my daughter 
up to see it, when could we come." Tr. 113-13. 
This Court in its opinion inferred that plaintiffs 
chose the form of contract on which this offer was to be 
made and accepted, and held that because the defendants 
n1isunderstood the contract that plaintiffs' agent had put 
before them and because of the fine print of the option 
clause, defendants were not bound thereby. This is not 
only contrary to the findings of fact of the trial court, 
but this Court has failed to consider the fact that the con-
tract was made on a printed earnest money receipt and 
offer to purchase, which was prepared by the Securities 
Commission of the State of r tah, and approved by the 
Attorney General of the State of rtah. Exhibit 1. This 
is the only form which the law allows a real estate agent 
to use and on which this transaction could have been 
handled. Section 61-~-:W l-:-tah Code Annotated, 1953, pro-
vides as follows: 
"lt i~ ex1n·p~sly provided that a real estate 
sales1nan shall haYe the right to fill out and com-
plete an C'anH'st 1noney receipt and agree1nent in 
forms apJJrorcd by the commission and forms 
providPd h~· statuh~ and that a real estate broker 
shall havp the rig·ht to fill out and c01nplete forms 
of legal doctunents nPressary to any real estate 
1rm1~a<'i ion to whieh the said broker is a party as 
principal or agPnt. aud 1rhich forms hare been ap-
}Jrorcd h.11 the Commission and the Attorney Gen-
eral of the State of Ctah.'' (En1phasis added) 
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l~se of any other form by the real estate salesman would 
be considered the practice of law. Neither the plaintiffs, 
the real estate agent, nor the defendants had anything 
to do with the preparation of the printed wording of the 
contract. The defendants made the offer on this form, 
the blanks having been filled in according to Hansens' 
instructions, tr. 27-14, and the trial court found that they 
fully understood the terms of the ~ame. 11he defendants 
made no point of the fine print of the contract either 
in the court below or before this court, nor did they ob-
ject to the form of the printed contract in any manner. 
In fact the defendants must have found it satisfactory 
and been familiar with it since they had recently sold 
their own home using the same printed contract. Tr. 
170 and 171. This earnest money receipt and offer to 
purchase, when accepted by the sellers, is a valid, un-
conditionally enforceable, and binding contract, con-
clusive and not contingent or executory in nature. Di-
rectly above the signatures of the defendants on the 
contract appears the following: 
We do hereby agree to carry out and fuJfill 
the terms and conditions specified above, and the 
seller agrees to furnish good and marketable title 
with abstract to date or at sellers' option a policy 
of title insurance in the name of the purchaser 
and to make final conveyance by warranty deed 
or ____________ ; in the event of sale of other than real 
properties the seller will provide evidence of title 
or right to sell or lease. If either party fails so to 
do, he agrees to pay all e:rzJenses of enforcinu this 
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agreement or of any rights anstng out of the 
breach thereof including a reasonable attorney's 
fee. 
The seller agrees in consideration of the ef-
forts of the agent in procuring a purchaser, to pay 
said agent a commission equal to the minimum 
recommended by the Salt Lake Real Estate Board. 
In the event seller has entered into a listing con-
tract with any other agent and said contract is 
presently effective, this paragraph will be of no 
force or effect. (Emphasis added) 
The above italicized ·wording clearly contemplates 
that a suit might properly be brought to (1) enforce the 
agreement (specific performance), or (2) "enforce any 
rights arising out of the breach thereof" (Legal dam-
ages). 
Defendants did realize the binding nature of this 
contract, as indicated by the trial court's findings and 
they admitted that they were bound by the contract. 
Sterling G. \Yebber of Holt Realty testified as follows: 
A. I was introduced to the Hansens by :Jirs. 
AbbeY, and we sat in the sales office there in 
priY<{te, and I asked the1n what the problem 
see1ned to be, and she said they just decided that 
tlw~~ did not want to purchase the h01ne, and I 
a~krd thPm Yer~- point blank if .Jirs. ~\bbey Inis-
rPprp::-;rntPd an~·thing, or did she t"ist their arn1 
in any \Ya:·. in getting the offer. \Ye like to ha\e 
<'Y('r~·onp ha pp:· in t•n·r~- transaction we handled, 
and t1H'\~ ~aid. "I\ o, sh<> did not." that there nerer 
1f'as an,;, prc .... ·sltrc of au.11 kind iHrolced, and I 
a.sk<'d t hPm what theY wanted to do - what theY 
want<'d 1ue to do. as ·a broker, in the thing. · 
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They savd they would like to get out of it if 
they could. I said, "Well, I would have no authori-
ty to let thern out, but I would be happy to discuss 
the matter with l\fr. Andreasen, and go over the 
matter with him. 
Q. Did Mr. Hansen say anything - any con-
versation with him 1 
A. Yes, he said that he had purchased the 
home and he knew he was bound on the thing, but 
because his wife being so upset, that they would 
like to get out from mtder purchasing it if they 
could. Tr. 60-6. (Emphasis added) 
The Supreme Court's opinion further infers that the 
defendants were justified in breaching the contract. On 
the contrary, the trial court specifically found as follows: 
"Without any jusisdiction or excuse the de-
fendants breached said contract and did refuse 
and fail to perform the terms of said contract. 
Paragraph 2, Findings of Fact. 
The trial court further found: 
"At all times the plaintiffs were ready, will-
ing, and able to perform said contract. Plaintiffs 
did not breach said contract in any particular." 
Paragraph 3, Findings of Fact. 
The record further shows that plaintiffs' agent Holt 
Realty offered to assist the defendants in any way they 
could and offered to help at no cost in disposing of the 
property. Tr. 61-4, :Mrs. Abbey testified as follows: 
"Mr. Webber said he would talk to Mr. An-
dreasen again. He also said if l\1 r. Andreason held 
them to the contract, that he would list the house, 
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or take it and sell it and try to get out, without 
any commission so far as they were concerned, or 
try and see they lost no money by it, or we would 
rent it for them if they didn't wish to move into 
it thernselves, while we are trying to work out the 
problem for them." Tr. 35-23. 
Plaintiffs did not sue "with vengeance'' as indicated 
by this Court's opinion, but in fact made every effort 
possible to try and encourage defendants to perform and 
to try and get a better price on the second sale in order 
to mitigate damages. Mr. Andreasen himself phoned 
other people who had been around to see the property 
in an effort to get a better price on the second sale. 
The main opinion of the Supreme Court presented 
the "facts" as unsuccessfully argued to the trial court 
by the defendants. Such "facts" are contrary to the actual 
facts as shown by the record and found by the trial court. 
The trial court fully heard the defendants contentions 
and disbelieved then1. 
It appears therefore that the Supren1e Court's treat-
ment of the evidence is clearly eontrary to the rules 
previou~l~· ~takd by thit' court requiring the Supreme 
( 
1onrt to n•viP\\" the evidence with e\ery inference and 
i111PndrtH'1lt fairly arising therefrmn in favor of the 
party pn•v<ding in the trial court. 
A thorough reading of the transcript will reveal 
amplP Pvidcner in support of plaintiffs' contentions and 
ample Pvid<'lH'l' in support of the Findings and judg-
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ment of the trial court. Plaintiffs were not required to 
prove their facts conclusively, but were only required to 
prove them by a preponderance of evidence, and such 
a preponderance is contained in the record. 
Contrary to the inference contained in the Supreme 
Court's opinion the transcript reveals that it was the 
sellers who throughout the entire transaction dealt in 
strict good faith, as found by the trial court, and it is 
they who are entitled to sympathy and not the defaulting 
vendees whose unjustified actions injuriously affected 
the sellers' rights. 
The Supreme Court considered the trial court to 
have acted under a misapprehension of the law regarding 
damages. Even if this were so, it does not justify the 
Supreme Court in overruling the findings of the trial 
court on other issues where there was no misapprehen-
sion of the law, some of such issues being: 
a. Defendants' full understanding of the nature 
of the contract. 
b. Plaintiffs' good faith in executing the contract, 
tendering performance and mitigating damages. 
c. Defendants' lack of justification for breaching 
the contract. 
d. Credibility of witnesses. 
e. The fact that plaintiff elected to ~uP for actual 
damages rather than forfeiture of the earnest money. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFFS 
AND RESPONDENTS HAD ELECTED TO RETAIN THE 
EARNEST MONEY PAID AS LIQUIDATED AND AGREED 
DAMAGES. 
The trial court specifically found as follows: 
.. In Inaking said contract the defendants de-
posited the sum of $50.00 as earnest money with 
Holt Realty Company. Plaintiffs did not at any 
time agree or elect to accept or retain said earnest 
money in lieu of danwges." Paragraph 4, Find-
ings of Fact. (Emphasis added) 
This finding is fully supported by the evidence and 
there is no evidence to the contrary. The transcript con-
tains supporting facts as follows: 
The defendants entered into an unconditional con-
tract to purchase real estate. Before the defendants 
voiced any desire to withdraw from the contract the 
sellers, relying on tlus unconditional contract, had 
changed their position to their detriment by discouraging 
other interested parties frmn viewing the property, by 
infonning salesman not to bring others to look at the 
proJwrt)-. Tr. 91-11. 91-:2:~. 92-13. and since the sale had 
lwPn reported to the real estate board the listing was 
withdrawn fr01n the ~fulitple Listing Bureau, Tr. 61-11, 
Gl-16, (i.f-~7, G-l--2D, 65-6. Defendants thereafter announced 
tht>ir dP~ir<> to withdraw fron1 the contract and suggested 
that plaintiffs retain tlle earnest Inoney and relieve the 
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defendants of their contractual obligation. The plaintiffs 
clearly, specifically and repeatedly stated to the de-
fendants that they would not release the defendants fron1 
the obligation, that the earnest money was insufficient 
to cover either the obligations already incurred by plain-
tiffs or the contemplated and possible future damages, 
that the plaintiffs elected to hold the defendants to such 
actual damages as might arise, and that they would not 
accept or elect to allow the defendants to forfeit the 
earnest money in lieu of damages. Mr. Andreasen testi-
fied as follows concerning a conversation with :Mr. 
Hansen: 
A. This was by telephone. I telephoned ~Ir. 
Hansen from my office, and told him that the tin1e 
was drawing near. I think it was Tuesday when 
the deal was to be closed and the money paid, and 
that I wanted to discuss it with him, since they 
had raised this question as to whether they were 
going to perform, and I asked him again what the 
difficulty was, why he did not want to take it. 
Well, his wife decided she did not want it. He 
said that was the only reason. He said, uw e are 
having trouble here irn the family about it, and we 
would rather not take it." And he said, ''TVhy 
don't you j1tst take the $50.00." 
I told him, no, that would not begin to pay 
for my damages, that the new commission alone 
would be many times that much. I d£rl not know 
what the new deal would be, with whal terms it 
would be, and I might be able to get a better deal 
or might have to take a worse one. ' 
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I said I would not consider the $50.00 in settle-
ment of the damages that it was entirely inade-
quate, and I explained to him to either perform 
the contract, or I would hold him responsible for 
whatever damages I suffered by his breach of 
the contract." Tr. 82-3. (Emphasis added) 
Mr. Andreasen further testified concerning a 
conversation with 1\{rs. Hansen: 
She said, "\V ell, we are having some family 
trouble about it. \V e just decided we can't take 
it and we ·would like to \\-ithdraw. Will you le1 
us out of it~" 
And I told her it was not as simple as that, 
that the agent had performed the services in find-
ing a buyer and that when that was done, I had 
then become obligated to pay a real estate com-
nlission of $750, and that I was not about to stand 
that loss and pay the extra costs of re-selling it. 
I told her further that other agents who had 
been bringing people to see the house, I had told 
them it had been sold, and told them not to bother 
to bring any further custon1ers ; that I had told 
l\fr. \Y ebber to cancel the listing, told him I had 
1nade arrangenwnts. that it would be extreinely 
inconvenient and bothersmne for Ine to start all 
over again for a sale. 
I told her that I did not know when or what 
kind of a deal T ('Ould get for a resale. I 1night 
R<'ll it for n1ore or less. "'e did not lmow. There 
is the po~~ibilit~· W<' might lutn:) to take a lot less. 
J would n~:-:ullw that loss, that I would stand that 
J o~s. and I would hold her responsible for it. Tr. 
~0-22 through 81-10. 
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He in no way attempted to advise the defendants 
as an attorney, as inaccurately and unfairly suggested by 
this Court's opinion. In fact, defendants had an attroney 
but refused to disclose the name of this attorney to 
plaintiffs so that plaintiffs could discuss the matter 
with him. Up to the time of performance of the contract, 
February 7, the plaintiffs repeatedly urged the defend-
ants to perform, and it was only after refusal on the 
part of the defendants to either perform or discuss the 
matter, that on February 8 the plaintiffs commenced 
action against the defendants to recover damages and to 
clear the title. The complaint of the plaintiffs states at 
Paragraph 3 : 
Defendants paid to Holt Realty and Invest-
ment Company the sum of $50.00 to apply upon 
the purchase price of said property, and said 
$50.00 is held in trust by Holt Realty and Invest-
ment Company to be applied pursuant to order of 
this court. (Emphasis added) 
The finding of the trial court that the plaintiffs did not 
elect to retain the earnest money in lieu of damages 
is in accord both with the facts of the case and is in 
accord with the well-known principle that the law d<ws 
not require one to do a useless act. It is also in accord 
with common sense business practices. It is contrary to 
such practices to require that a person say for example, 
"You have paid me $100.00 earnest money and have now 
breached your contract damaging me in the sum of 
$1,000.00. Here is your $100.00 back. I will now ~uP you 
to try and get the $100.00 back plus an additional 
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$900.00." It is reasonable to say, "You have paid me 
$100.00 in earnest money and have breached your con-
tract, damaging me in the su1n of $1,000.00. Your $100.00 
now constitutes a set off against your obligation of 
$1,000.00. Now pay me $900.00 for the balance of my 
damage.'' The view of this transaction as taken by the 
Supreme Court is not only an unrealistic method of 
transacting business but it puts an impossible burden 
on the seller especially in a situation where he does not 
know the financial circumstances surrounding his buyer 
or his credit reputation, and will not know whether he 
will ever recover his damages or not. It leaves the seller 
in a position where he must, before selling his property, 
cmnpute the amount which he will be damaged should 
the sale fail and require that amount of earnest money 
of every prospective purchaser. 
Such is not the purpose of earnest money. Earnest 
money is not a n1easure of the amount of money the 
purchaser is going to risk on a transaction as urged by 
the defendants. X or should earnest money be confused 
with the price paid for an option to purchase. Earnest 
mon<'y is dt>fined as follows: 
"The payn1ent of a part of tl1e price of goods 
sold or the deliYPry of part of such goods, for 
the }JIIrpos(' of binding the contract. A token or 
ph'dgP passing between the parties b:- way of 
Pvid('JH'(\ or ratification of the sale." Black's Law 
Dictionary, 3rd Ed., P. 635. (E1nphasis added) 
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The holding of the Supreme Court that plaintiffs 
had elected to retain the earnest money received as liqui-
dated damages for the breach of the contract, contrary 
to the findings of fact of the trial court, has converted 
this earnest money receipt and offer to purchase, which 
has been prepared by the Securities Commission and 
approved by the Utah Attorney General, as a binding 
contract, into a mere option to purchase, and has removed 
all binding effect from the contract. 
Defendants in their brief on appeal have cited to 
this court many cases which have precluded a seller in 
a contract providing for liquidated damages, frmn suing 
for additional damages in addition to, or in lieu of 
retaining the liquidated damages. None of the cases cited 
by defendants involve contracts with provisions like the 
one in this case. The clause by which defendants here 
seek to avoid their legal obligations is as follows: 
In the event the purchaser fails to pay the 
balance of the said purchase price or complete 
said purchase as herein provjded the amounts 
paid hereon shall at the option of the seller be 
retained as liquidated and agreed damages. ( I~m­
phasis added) 
In Royer v. Carter 233 P2d 539 (Cal. l!):ll) a contrad 
with a very similar provision was considered. This con-
tract provided : 
Should the purchaser fail to pay the balance 
of the purchase price, or fail to complete t hP 
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purchase as herein provided, the amounts paid 
hereon may at the option of the seller, be retained 
as a consideration for the execution of this agree-
Inent by the seller. (Emphasis added) 
A comparison of these two provisions reveals very few 
differences. The defendants in Royer v. Carter made the 
sa1ne contention as made in the instant case: the plaintiff 
had an option to retain the down payment instead of 
suing for damages and that the option was exercised 
by retaining the deposit. The Supreme Court of Califor-
nia held at 233 P2d 539, 541: 
The retention of the deposit was not, how-
ever, inconsistent with plaintiffs right to elect to 
hold the defendant responsible for damages. In-
dependently of any right she may have had under 
the option clause itself ... plaintiff had the al-
ternative right to retain the do"\\'ll payment as a 
set off against her actual da1nages ... Her reten-
tion of the n1oney was consistent with the choice of 
either re1nedy. And she informed defendant of 
her intention to hold defendant liable for actual 
da1nages if the latter did not perform the contract, 
and since her eonduet was not inconsistent with 
the eleetion of that re1nedv the trial eourt was 
justified in finding that t11e ·"deposit was retained 
by her to apply on dmnages sustained by reason 
of defendant's breaeh of contract.·· 
The defendant in the R o !IC r case also contended that she 
entered into the contract thinking she could forfeit her 
down payn1ent and be relieved of further liability. As in 
the instant case the trial court specifically found that 
the defendant did not enter into the contract under that 
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impression, and its holding was upheld by the California 
Supreme Court. The court therefore upheld the trial 
court's award to the plaintiff of the di'fference between 
! he contract price and the price at which the property 
was resold, plus the expenses incurred .in connection U'ith 
the second sale, less the amount of the down puymellf. 
These damages included the sales commission on the 
second sale. The Royer case, therefore, is strikingl:' 
similar to the instant case both in fact and in procedural 
aspects. 
Gattuccio v. Kallam 314 P2d 178 (Cal. 1957) was also 
a similar situation. The buyer there had paid $10,000.00 
as a deposit, the agreement also providing that in the 
event the buyers failed to complete the purchase, thn 
$10,000.00 could be retained by the seller at the seller's 
option. The sellers proved that they were damaged in 
the sum of $18,000.00 and the buyer contended that the 
seller had elected to receive the $10,000.00 deposit as 
full damages. The court, citing Royer v. Carter, supra, 
made the following holding which is fully applicable to 
the instant case: 
Independently of any rights he may have had 
under the option clause itself, plaintiff had the 
alternative right to retain the down payment as 
a set off against her actual damages. 
Some of the issues in Sheffield /). Paul P. Stone 
Inc., 98 F. 2d 250 (C.A. D.C. 1938), are identical with 
the case at hand and some of the issues are completely 
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different because the case arises out of an entirely dif-
ferent procedural situation and because of important 
differences in the facts. Sheffield v. Stone involves a 
::;uit by a defaulting purchaser to recover a $500.00 earn-
est deposit on a real estate contract. The contract in 
that case provided that the earnest money deposit might 
be forfeited at the option of the seller, or that the seller 
1night avail himself of any other legal or equitable rights 
under the contract. The case differs in an important 
respect frmn the present case in that the record there 
indicates that the house was sold to a third party after 
the buyers' breach, for a sum in excess of the contract 
price, but the record does not show whether it was the 
gross price or the net price which exceeded the contract 
price. Nine· months after the plaintiffs' repudiation of 
the contract, six 1nonths after the sale of the house to 
a third party, and two months after the plaintiffs haJ 
demanded the return of the deposit, action was brought 
hr the defaulting buyers to recover the earnest money. 
The first issue involved was whether such retention 
of the earnest 1noney by the seller eonstituted an exer-
cise of the seller's option to forfeit the deposit. The court 
defined forfeiture of the deposit to 1nean "keep it as 
liquidated damages and call the contract off." The con-
tentions of the parties were just opposite to the eonten-
tions in the present rase. The seller contended that the 
retention of the earnest nwney constituted an exercise 
of the option to forfeit the earnest nwney and the de-
faulting hu)·ers contended that the retention of the earn-
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to forfeit the earnest money. The United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the 
retention of the earnest money was not an exercise of 
the option to forfeit the earnest money and did not 
preclude the sellers from claiming actual damages ( a8 
determined by the difference between the contract price 
and the price at which the property was sold to third 
parties less the expenses of the second sale to third 
parties). The court stated at page 252: 
When plaintiffs' breach occurred two alter-
native remedies, apart from a suit for specific 
performance, were open to defendants: (1) to 
"forfeit" the deposit, i.e. to retain it as liquidated 
damages and call the deal off; ( 2) to establish 
the actual damages by selling the house to third 
persons, and hold plaintiffs for the damages so 
established. Defendants chose the second course. 
Their letter of December 30 expressed that choice 
plainly. They had never expressed, and appar-
ently had never formed, an intention to "forfeit" 
the deposit as liquidated damages. They not only 
expressed an intention to collect actual damages 
but procce:Ied to fix their amount, if any, by a 
resale of the house. We think they thereby availed 
themselves of "legal or equitable rights" under 
the contract so as to preclude them, by a fair 
interpretation of the option clause, from electing 
to forfeit the deposit, i.e. to clain1 it as liquidated 
damages. They cannot be permitted to make their 
choice between liquidated and actual damages 
after they have determined which are the greater; 
for the intent of the option clause is not to give 
them that advantage, but to make it unnecessary 
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for them to ascertain actual damages. 
Since the sellers were not making claim or counter-
claim to recover damages, and since it appears from 
the record that the actual damages did not equal or 
exceed the amount of the deposit, this case does not in-
volve either by holding or by dictum the question pre-
sented by a situation where the actual damages do exceed 
the amount of the deposit. The court remanded the case 
for further hearing to determine the amount of the actual 
damages, and held that the seller could retain actual 
damages, and that the defaulting purchaser could not 
recover the earnest 1uoney payment unless and only to 
the extent that it exceeded actual damages. 
X either defendant nor the Court's opinion cite any 
authority inconsistent with the above, and plaintiffs' 
research has revealed no cases on the smne or sinrilar 
facts, inconsistent with those above. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN REVERSING THE JUDGMENT 
SINCE IN SO DOING IT REVERSED THE TRIAL COURT'S 
JUDGMENT QUIETING TITLE IN PLAINTIFFS AND RE-
SPONDENTS AS AGAINST DEFENDANTS AND APPELL-
ANTS. 
The defendants gained equitable title to plaintiffs' 
property by virhtP of the agree1nent since it is an agree-
lnent which is subject to an action for specific perform-
ance. It wa~ neressar~~. if for nothing else, to bring an 
action to quiet title since defendants failed and refused 
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to discuss the matter with plaintiffs after repeated de-
mands. Defendants refused to meet with the plaintiffs 
to resolve the difficulties, and even refused to divulge 
the name of their attorney to plaintiffs for a negotiated 
settlement, and therefore clouded plaintiffs title by their 
equitable interest in the property. 
As stated by this Court's opinion the award of at-
torney's fees is conditioned upon the necessity for in-
curring them and upon the plaintiffs being justified in 
their demands. The award of attorney's fees in the in-
stant case is justified by the necessity of a quiet title 
action alone. 
POINT IV 
IF LOSS OF AN ADVANTAGEOUS BARGAIN IS NO 
LONGER A PROPER MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR 
BREACH OF A CONTRACT TO PURCHASE REAL ESTATE, 
THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL 
TO CORRECTLY ASSESS DAMAGES UNDER A CORRECT 
MEASURE AS SET OUT BY THIS COURT. 
This action is a legal action for damages for breach 
of contract, an ancient right firmly established in Anglo-
American law. Breach of contract for sale of real estate 
occurs under many highly varied circu1nstances and vari-
ous rules have been announced to fit the various circum-
stances of different cases. In cases such as the instant 
case many respectable authorities including the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah have held the measure of 
damages to be "loss of an advantageous bargain." Per-
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kins v. Spencer 121 Utah 468, 243 P2d 446, 451, held: 
The vendors are entitled to any loss occa-
sioned them by any of these factors : ( 1) Loss of 
an .advantageous bargain; (2) any damage to or 
depreciation of the property; (3) any decline in 
value due to change in market value of the prop-
erty not allowed in items numbers 1 and 2; and 
( 4) for the fair rental value of the property dur-
ing the period of occupancy. (Emphasis added) 
The Supreme Court in Cole v. Parker 5 Utah 2d 263, 
300 P2d 623, quoted the foregoing as the rule of damages 
and held that the plaintiff in that case could recover 
the difference between the contract price and the price 
for which he could sell the property. See also Royer z:. 
Carter and Gattucio ·v. Kallam, supra. 
Undisputed testimony at the trial showed the plain-
tiffs made extensive and intensive efforts to find an-
other buyer, and were not able to sell the property except 
upon terms less advantageous than the Hansen contract, 
to the plaintiffs' substantial loss. 
Plaintffs have sought and now seek only legal compen-
satory dan1ages to restore this loss caused by defendants' 
breach of contract. Plaintiffs and the trial court pro-
ceeded upon the theory that loss of an advantageous 
bargain was the proper means of ascertaining just com-
pensatory da1nages for the breach of this contract. The 
plaintiffs still believe that this is the true n1easure of 
da1nages appropriate to this case. However, the main 
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opinion of this Court appears to overrule the pronounce-
ment of Cole vs. Parker and Perkin~ 'US. Spencer, supra, 
as to the measure of damages. If in fact loss of an ad-
vantageous bargain is no longer a proper measure of 
damages for breach of a contract to purchase real estate 
and the plaintiffs and the trial court were in error in 
following this theory, the Supren1e Court in this appeal 
should not reverse the trial court but should remand 
the case to be properly tried under a correct measure 
of damages as defined by this Court. Plaintiffs therefore 
urge the Court (1) to affirm the judgment of the trial 
court awarding damages for loss of an advantageous 
bargain or (2) if the cases of Cole v. Parker and Perkin . ., 
v. Spencer, supra, are no longer the law, to give the 
plaintiffs opportunity to prove their loss under a correct 
measure of damages. 
In the rehearing a clarification should also be made 
as to the degree of proof regarding damages in a civil 
action. The main opinion of the Supreme Court appear::; 
to upset well-established principles as to degree of proof, 
requiring a party in a civil suit for legal damages to 
prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. 
For example, the opinion states that there was ''no cer-
tainty" that it was necessary to include the refrigerator 
in the second sale. The evidence is clear and uncontra-
dicted that it was necessary to include the refrigerator. 
Is a preponderance of evidence still sufficient, or must 
the plaintiff now establish each item of damages with 
"certainty" 1 Also, plaintiffs' evidence contained much 
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uncontradicted testinwny and evidence as to the reason-
able Inarket value of the property. The Court stated 
that the plaintiffs' evidence was not "conclusive." Is it 
necessary that each item of damage in an action for 
legal damages be proved "conclusively" or is proof by 
preponderance sufficient~ 
COXCLeSIOX 
For the reasons set forth the plaintiffs and respond-
ents respectfully submit that the record fully supports 
the findings of the trial court and its judgment in favor 
of the plaintiffs and respondents, and respectfully re-
quests the Court to grant a rehearing and affirm the 
findings and judgment of the trial court, or in the al-
ternative, remand the case to the trial court for the pur-
pose of correctly assessing da1nages consistent with 
proper instructions of this Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN H. ALLEK 
Attorney for Plai;utiffs and 
Re,..,·pondents 
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